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Chapter 39 of 55 · The Principles of Ethics, Volume II by Herbert Spencer

VII. Restraints on Praise

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CHAPTER VII. RESTRAINTS ON PRAISE. § 421. How that fornl of altruism which we here dis tinguish as negative beneficence, should put any check on praise, is not obvious: to most, indeed, will appear incom prehensi ble. They see at once that regard for truth should in many cases suppress the wish to give pleasure by applause. They do not doubt that when, even if there is no thought of gaining favour, there is professed an admiration which is not felt, a fault has been committed. The ancient Egyptian Ptah~hotep declared that " he who departs from truth to be agreeable is detestable;" and in the intervening fi ve thousand years there have continued to be reprobations of flattery. In our own day the untruthfulness of one who utters insincere eulogies, excites a little contempt, even in the person eulogized. All feel, if they do not say, that there is something wrong in a kindness "rhich prolnpts undeserved compliments.

But the avoidance of falsehood is in such cases the iInplied requirement. From veracity, and not from nega tive beneficence, the interdict is supposed exclusively to COlne. The withholding of laudations when they are not merited, cannot, it is thought. be referred to that form of altruism Vitrhich refrains from acts and words productive of pain. Surely it nlust be a mistake to include restraints on praise under the head of negative beneficence ~ (322) RESTRAINTS ON PRAISE. 323 No, there are other restraints besides those which truth fulness iInposes. Even supposing the applause uttered ~r displayed arises from genuine admiration, there are circumstances under which it should be kept back. The desire to give immediate pleasure has often to be suppressed by the desire to further ultimate welfare; now of the indi vidual, now of society. It is difficult to deal separately with these checks to laudation, shown sometimes in look and nlanner, some tiInes in words, which are dmnanded sometimes by sincerity, and sometimes by consideration of rernote effects instead of proximate effects. There ,,,,ill be no harm in lllassing together the variously-required withholdings of praise, which often involve considerable self-sacrifice for others' benefit.

§ 422. Adnliration for the child is by irnplication reflected on to the .mother; and, consciously or unconsciously desiring this adrniration, the mother summons her little boy frolll the nursery to be seen by a visitor. Already vanity, dominant enough in existing hurnanity at large, has been Inade specially active in the little urchin by daily Ininistra tions-by special attentions to pretty clothes, to carefully curled hair, and by flattering relllarks of the nursemaid~ Shall you please the child and gratify the lnother by some cOlnplimentary remark-shall you encourage her still more to foster the child's self-consciousness and appetite for approbation? Not to "do this will cause disappointment to both, and will perhaps diminish the mother's friendly feeling. ):~et a far-seeing regard for both will arrest the expected·eulogy. I-Iere again is a handsome young lady accustorned to tribute in words and looks. She is constantly thinking of the admiration she excites and is looking for signs of it. Unquestionably her beauty is great-so. great tha,t you can scarcely avoid . showing that you recognize it.

59 324 THE ETHIOS OF SOOIAL LIFE. Shall you give her the pleasure she seeks by letting your glances be seen? If you .think only of proximate results you may; but not if you think also of remote results. If you recognize the fact that already her nature is in large lneasure deformed by vanity-if you vvatcb the manifestations of her purely egoistic desire, and see how it excludes from consciousness altruistic desires, which should predolninate; you will endeavour to avoid sho,ving that you are thinking any more about her than about other persons. Such self-restraint, caUed for by negative beneficence, ,vill probably be thought by many needless or even absurd. If, however, they will consider that the mental attitude described often proves a deplorable one, eventually en tailing unhappiness on self and others-if they remember that it is liable in after years to. vitiate domestic life in various "rays, even to the extent of lnaking mothers jealous of their daughters; and if they remember that it has been developed year after year by the open and tacit flatteries of those around; they will see that the reticence here insisted on is not unimportant.

§ 423. Kindred restraints; imposed now by sincerity and now by the wish to avoid doing injury, are called for in multitudinous cases where the applause expected is of something achieve~-a book, a poem, or a speech, a painting or other work of plastic art, a song or a musical performance. In private life the spectator or auditor finds it difficult to act conscientiously. The wish not to disap.. point prompts the utterance' of approval which is not felt, and shuts out froln thought the evils that may arise from uncandid .speeches. Where encouragement is needed, there should of course be no greater restraint on praise than is required by truthfulness; and something ITlay commonly be found in the way of partial approval which, serving to give pleasure without fostering vanity, Illay RESTRAINTS ON PRAISE. 325 serve to excite further efforts. If the product is a sketch or a decorative work, there· need be. no check caused by thought of remoter consequences; but if the product is of a literary kind-verses, an essay, or perhaps a volurne there should usually be a suppression of words which Inight encourage an unrealizable ambition. Silence, or ad verse criticism gently expressed, is in such cases kind: not alone as perhaps preventing future disappointment of the aspirant, but also as tending to prevent public evil. Verses which have no true poetry in theIn, and books which con tain neither facts nor thoughts of any value, do not sin1ply entail loss to the community in paper and print thrown away, but help to smother things of true worth. The with..

holding of praise· hence beconles in multitudinous eases a duty to the world at large. Negative beneficence commands silence. Evils less widely diffused, but more conspicuous,. arise from applauding those who have received the customary musical culture but have. no considerable Inusical faculty, and who, on all available occasions, are invited to per form for the supposed pleasure of those around. The pestilent social system which aitns to make everyindi vidual as like every other individual· as possible, by passing all through. the same educational mill, insists on giving to each young lady lessons in singing, and a course of instruction on the piano; even though she has not a tolerable ear, and is utterly averse to the practices she has to go through. Daily, for years, are caused weariness to the pupil and irritation to the teachers, annoyance to the household, nuisance to the neighbours; and all to achieve the result that "rhen there COInes an evening party, a song ill-sung 01' an ill-played piece on the piano, Inay be inflicted upon guests,·who hypocritically say "Thank you." Manifestly the giving of praise, which sin cerity forbids, is also here forbidden by' regard for the general welfare. Negative beneficence of the wider kind 326 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE.

interdicts utterances which, individually trivial though they rnay be, serve by their aggregate effect to lllaintain a system that vitiates social intercourse. It goes without saying that duty to society should still more imperatively forbid the public critic from giving cur rency to nnmerited encolniums. § 424. There is a forIn of praise allied to flattery which also needs to be restrained-the tacit flattery implied by constant agreement with another person's opinions. If, on the one hand, we lUUSt disapprove of that nature which always finds reason to dissent, we rnnst, on the other hand, disapprove of that nature which (moved perhaps in SOllle measure by syrnpathy but often in a greater Ineasure by a kind of servility) always finds reason to assent. Of course regard for truth represses this undue tendency to coincide with others' vie·ws. Save in those vyho have got no ideas at all, there cannot but frequently arise con victions at variance with those they hear; and to utter words inconsistent with these convictionsy everyone con den1ns as dishonest. Not only does sincerity require that the tacit praise taking this forul shall be restrained, but a far-seeing negative beneficence also requires it. It is not a matter of indifference 'whether another continues to be lieve that which you see reason to think is untrue. ..A..

double evil may result from an expressed acquiescence in his staternent or opinion. The error itself Inay have in jurious consequences to hitn; and, further, a groundless self-esteeln may be fostered. ~Ioreover, as an ultirnate effect of this acquiescent habit, social intercourse is rendered uninteresting by absence of mental conflict. Emerson some where reprobates the man who is "a mush of concession;" and it is clear that among those "rho are thus characterized, conversation Inust lose its point. All pronounced opinions and all individualities of character must disappear in a tame RESTRAINTS ON PRAISE. 327 uniformity, if everybody is anxious to please everybody else by agreeing with him. The restraint which, in this sphere, negative beneficence may rightly enjoin, is the n1aintaining of silence in cases where no good will be effected by avo'wed dissidence. Often it requires SOHle tact to preserve the right attitude -neither to express difference when it is useless nor to profess agreement when it is not felt; but there are cases in which such tact comes in aid of kindly feeling.

§ 425. The request to join in givirig public honour to an individual 'who has probably done no more than perform well the duties before him, calls for another restraining action of llegati ve beneficence. Passive resistance to the getting up of testimonials, is seen by many to be needful to prevent further gro,vth of an abuse. A presentation-portrait in recognition of services is proposed. If the man to be thus distinguished is actively sympathetic, he will prefer rather to go without such a mark of esteeln than to have his friends taxed all round that he Inay receive it: knowing, as he does, that in rnost cases their contributions would be given under ~ kind of moral coercion. But if the beneficiary, not thus unusually sympathetic, countenances the subscription, then one who, under the ordinary circumstances refuses to subscribe, Inay do this simply from a beneficent regard for the general welfare.

Even ,vhere the applause takes the form of a cost]ess testimonial, he may still often find good reason for re fraining froin joining in it. He may he restrained by the thought that the distdbution of testimonialsis ill-adjusted to the merits of individuals: n1any of the more worthy being passed over while the less worthy are honoured: the result being a misdirection of public opinion. And, further, he may be restrained by the belief that for the beneficiary to have done well what he had to do, should 328 THE ··ETHIOS OF SOOIAL LIFE. not be regarded as a reason for special eulogy; since everyone should do this as a matter of duty and not with a view to approbation. And here, indeed, ,ve COlne upon a final reason for being reticent of praise. As was pointed out in The Principles of Psychology, §§ 519-523, the ego-altruistic sentiments have been, from early days down to our own; among the chief regulators of social conduct; and have been needful in the absence of anything like adequate alnounts of the altruistic sentiments. Desires for reputation, fame, glory, have been the prompters; and not desires to· do the appointed work, discharge obligations,beha ve kindly. Love of praise has in large rneasure served in place of love of rectitude. The .. pro-ethical sentiments have had to rule because the ethical sentirnents were not strong enough to take their places.

But if so, it follows that a higher state, individual and social, will be one in which" the last infirn1ity of noble lninds" ,vill have greatly diminished; and in which, by implication, applause will be less sought for and less given. Men will be ruled by higher motives than love of approbation; and approbation being less demanded will be less yielded. From which conclusion it is a corollary that the appetite for praise should be discouraged. -'-~ far-seeing desire to further hurnan development, rpay rightly become a motive for often withholding applause-especially where it is greedily claimed.

The Principles of Ethics, Volume II

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