Tariffs and National Defense

"Yes," you may say, "but copper is a scarce material, and we should conserve it." Every economic good is scarce; otherwise it would command no price. If it were to become scarce enough and valuable enough, the do mestic consumers would probably bid the price up to a point where no foreign buyer could afford it. It may be argued that mere men, acting individually, cannot know the future needs of mankind and, therefore, cannot be wise enough to conserve scarce materials. So a bureau or commission made up of these men is estab lished by government to make such decisions! In connection with conservation, it has been repeat edly demonstrated that no one is more concerned with the conservation and use of property than its owner. No better system of conservation has ever been discovered than private ownership. What the government owns be longs to no one, and the likelihood of its wise conserva tion is remote indeed. This is. as true of products for export as it is of those ~traded and used domestically.

Tariffs and National Defense Bastiat is reported to have said that if goods do not cross frontiers, armies will. The cause of war is a hotly debated question which probably will never be settled to everyone's satisfaction. Nevertheless, there appears to be considerable evidence to show that wars are fought for economic as well as 63 political reasons-restrictions against trade, monopoly control of raw materials, attempts to be "self-contained," isolationism, nationalism, and the like. Many persons believe that the best single deterrent to war would be a willingness on the part of individuals the world over to trade freely. With this thought in mind, the removal of tariffs and other trade restrictions should be a prime weapon of national defense. But instead, the national defense argu ment is often. used to advance the restriction idea, which, as Bastiat said, promotes war. It is asked what we would do in case of war if we were placed at the mercy of foreign countries for essential products. Bastiat answered that question in this way: "The kind of dependence which results from exchange, from commercial transactions, is a reciprocal depend ence. We cannot be dependent on the foreigner with out the foreigner being dependent on us.... To break up natural relations is not to place ourselves in a state of independence, but in a state of isolation. . . . A nation isolates itself looking forward to the possibility of war; but is not this very act of isolating itself the beginning of war? . . . Let countries be permanent markets for each other's produce; let their reciprocal relations be such that they cannot be broken without inflicting on each other the double suffering of priva tion and a glut of commodities; and they will no longer stand in need of naval armaments, which ruin them, and overgrown armies, which crush them; ...

and war will disappear for want of what supports it, 64 for want of resources, inducements, pretexts, and popular sympathy." It is not proposed to discuss here the logistics of war -to debate how best to prosecute a war or prepare for a war. The intent of this discussion is merely to point out one thing which leads to war and some of the pit falls of trade restrictions under the guise of wartime measures. Peanuts for Defense Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1952 re stricts the importation of peanuts, among other products, " . . . for the protection of the essential security interests and economy of the United States in the existingemergency in international relations. . . ." While one might readily concede that there is an "existing emergency in inter national relations," one might seriously question whether a restriction on the importation of peanuts would allevi ate or aggravate such an emergency.