Chapter XVI - Candidates and Qualifications for Office

The difficulty has been, certainly throughout the Northern States and in my lifetime, to induce first.. rate men like Marshall Field, or even men of second and third rate in comparison with him, to stand as candidates at all. Very few men of large achieve ment and independent means will so much as look at [ 288 ] Candidates and Qualifications for Office state, local, or even national office; with perhaps the exception of the Mayoralty of a great city, the Governorship of a state, or the Senatorship at Washington. The so-called minor legislative· offices, such as Selectman, Alderman, State Representative, or Senator, even Congressman, though in reality of immense collective importance, are not very attrac tive individually to men of character and independ ence. The reasons why are threefold: First, such men are unwilling to become mere cogs in either of the existing political "machines," in whose working they must rely on the support, or meet the opposition, of petty grafters for whom politics is a mere trade, and a very selfish and crooked one. Second, it seems an irritating waste of time to an experienced man to take part with stupid, selfish, cowardly majorities in long-drawn, tedious legislative sessions; without hope of accomplishing much of anything, but merely to rage internally at futilities. Third, the terms of such offices are too short, the constituencies represented, even in Congress,. too small, and the whole position too insignificant, too destitute of honor and reputa tionto be worth bothering with.

If, on the other hand, to take a concrete illustra tion, the city government of Chicago were reduced from 68 Aldermen (chosen by Wards, with elective Mayor, Comptroller, Treasurer, etc., as in my time) to say 7 Commissioners, chosen from the entire city at large, with control of appointive Executives; and their term of office were lengthened from the present aldermanic two years to four, or more; if the whole responsibility for organizing and carrying on the government, and handling the huge expenditures of that great city (which since my time have mounted, though unwarrantably, from $65,000,000 [ 289 ] Too ·Much Government-Too Much Taxation to $133,000,000 per annum) were entrusted to these' seven men; does not the reader feel, as I feel, that every first-rank man in that city would vie with Marshall Field in the legitimate ambition to crown a successful business career by successful public service as one of Chicago's Commissioners?

Would not the same thing hold proportionately true of the smaller governmental units and of the pro posed Senate (chosen at large) of the State of Illinois? Does not the reader agree with me that, if our ablest men did but desire public office, they would cer tainly put their abilities to work to get it? Finally, does not the reader agree with me that, if they got it, they could not afford to do other than their best, as constituting government of, by, and for the people ? Does not dignified, honorable, and conspicuous ser vice, destitute of money reward, appeal with peculiar force to those best fitted for it; and are they not such men as I have described? Qualifications for Public Office. As the plan proposed would limit elections entirely to legis lative office, and as it would concentrate legisla tive power in the hands of a very few members of each legislative body, upon whom public attention could readily be concentrated, and whose responsi bility could readily be enforced at the polls, the qualifications of candidates become a question of the highest importance.

They would be in general the same as the qualifica tions required for directorship or trusteeship in any large private enterprise, such as a railroad, bank, trust company, great manufacturing corporation, or great educational or charitable institution, public or quasi-public. The first of these qualifications is that of known success in private life, accompanied by sufficient private income to place the candidate [ 29°] Candidates and Qualifications for Office beyond the temptation of using his office for personal profit. Both of these qualifications are invariably required in choosing .directors or trustees for large private concerns; and they are justified by every reason of common sense and expediency. I have heretofore argued that the· circumstance of poverty is, of itself, a distinct disqualification for public office. After poverty should come, as a lead ing disqualification, the lack of experience in large affairs. No man should be entrusted with the farseeing commitments and large current expendi tures of the community, the state, or the nation, unless he has in his previous personal career showed his capacity for intelligent, efficient, and economical planning of big business, or its equivalent. No mere qualification. of honesty or good intention, though both of these are essential, can take the place of actual experience.

This means that candidates should not be young men. A senate should not be a political kindergar ten to teach toddlers. Despite such brilliant exam ples as Napoleon, Pitt, and Hamilton, they are so very exceptional. as to justify a general ruling against the candidacy of men younger than, for instance, forty-five. It would merely be, in the case of any particular man, a matter of waiting a few years,to attain the age necessary to justify his candidacy. Meantime, the business of the community would. not be half so likely to suffer, while waiting for his ma turity, as it would be by frequent immaturity in the rank and file of membership. Most men of first-class ability, by the age of 45, can save money enough to enable them to look forward to· political service in their later years, without becoming dependent thereon for their daily living. This last seems to me an indispensable requisite, for sound and un[ 291 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation biased judgment in public matters; and, taken to gether with the factor of experience, should be a sine qua non of candidacy. Both could easily be verified at the time of nomination; the question of income by sworn statement of the candidate, and the ques tion of experience by his record in business or profes sional life.

Even a "poor man," the trained and experienced representative ofa great political party, or labor organization, or social movement, would be entirely eligible under this qualification, if provided with a sufficient income by the organization for which he stands, though lacking private means of his own. His record of achievement, in building up and con trolling his own organization, would render him inde pendent; at least in regard· to matters not directly affecting that organization. There indeed he might be, and probably would be, biased; but, though un desirable, that bias might be disregarded, as true democratic representation of a group. I am not myself clear in my mind about this last; for the natural effort of existing organized minorities would be to put members of each organization as such into nomination and support them for election. This evil might, however, be minimized by the next rule regarding qualification, namely: No two members of the legislative body should belong to the same business, group, profession, or vocation, or should be supported financially by the same organized party. That is to say, there must not be two railroad men, two bankers, etc.; or two mem bers supported financially by the Democratic, Re publican, or Socialist parties, or by any trade union, farmer bloc, or the like. This would prevent the "packing" of any legislative body with members financially dependent upon any particular party or [ 292 ] Candidates and Qualificationsfor Office group; even upon a party which might for the mo ment constitute a majority of the people.

Public legislative office, under this plan, would become a sort of crowning reward ofa successful career in business, professional, or public life; but could never be the means of earning a livelihood, or accumulating a competence during the formative years of a man's career. As things are now, young men go into politics with the expectation of making their living and a successful career out of electing public officers; with all the demoralizing tendency to political selfishness and corruption which that implies. It seems to me that there is nothing in the theory of democracy that should enable a young man to pick and choose the public business and its treasury as his oyster, to be opened and devoured at his pleasure. It seems to me, again, that nothing in the theory of democracy demands representation of "the poor," or of any other class, by men whose circumstances and training are such as to disqualify them for safe and efficient representation. It seems to me (parenthetically, I may say that I am poor myself) that the poor would themselves better enjoy the privilege of choosing their representatives from among candidates of already accomplished fortune and success, than the necessity of casting their votes for one or another "cheap skate," who knows nothing about large affairs but is in great danger of small temptations. In short, I believe representative government can mean, if the people so desire, repre sentation by the richest mentally (and therefore financially), rather than by the poorest of their fellow citizens in both regards. / Once more, our most important task is to make public office attractive to high-grade men. In all local matters it is now distinctly unattractive; and [ 293 ] Too Much Government-"-Too Much Taxation the consequence is that high-grade men steer clear of it. If they really cared to serve the public, their great ability would certainly carry them into office.

The most far-reaching purpose of my suggestion, as here outlined, is to lead the ambitious American, whether banker, railroad man, merchant, lawyer, farmer, investor, or mere agitator, to look forward to serving his city, his state, or the nation in public life, as the finish of his successful career, in unselfish, unsalaried, and honorable work for all. For it is very certain that a man will work only for what he wants; and that in this strenuous world of ours very little comes to a man that he does not work for. -[ 294] CHAPTER XVII SHORT BALLOTS THE reader will at once perceive that the reduction in the number of local units and of elective officers to two, namely, local Commissioner and State Senator, would result in an extremely short ballot. As any such change could take place only by piecemeal, local unit by local unit, and state by state, it must synchronize with United States elections for Con gress, the Senate, and the Presidency. The Sena torial cycle is six years, the Presidential cycle four years, and the Congressional cycle two years. The state and local elections could be synchronized by holding one election each year, and making the term of office for local Commissioner and State Senator four years. The reader will then see that elections would drop naturally into cycles of four years. The first year's election might cover, for instance, only the office of local Commissioner; all the commis sioners to be elected at large on the same ballot.