15 The Struggle for Austria's Survival

When I went to Geneva I did not deceive myself about the hopelessness of Austria’s fight for autonomy.

The politicians at the fore lacked the ability to fight this battle externally; foreign countries were completely unknown to them. They neither understood their languages, nor their mentalities or political outlook. They were not even in the position to furnish information to attested foreign diplomats and journalists in Vienna. While in Vienna, diplomats made a study of the pleasures of the Heurigen¹ and enjoyed winter sports. Business affairs were left to press consultants of the missions. The most active of these was the Italian Eugenio Morreale.

The government did not concern itself with foreign newspapermen at all. Providing information to these correspondents was left to the Social Democrats.

The complete lack of ability on the part of Social Democratic leaders had catastrophic effects. Otto Bauer had elevated the demand for unification with Germany to the party platform in 1918. He based this on the notion that the authority of the proletariat was assured for all time in highly industrialized Germany. But in Austria, where the majority of the population was made up of farmers, farm workers, and craftsman, he feared defeat of the proletariat by the other classes. Bauer refused to alter his policies even when the National Socialists seized power in Germany. In his stubbornness, he failed to see that holding fast to an Anschluss program was grist in the mill of the Nazis.

The Social Democrats simply did not want to recognize that it was only the Italians who were ready to support Austria in its fight against the National Socialist takeover. They fought passionately against a “fascist” course of foreign policy. In January of 1934, Dollfuss was ready to surrender to the National Socialists. Negotiations were already quite advanced when, in the last minute, Italy put in its veto. “Il Duce” sent his undersecretary of state, Suvich, to Vienna to assure the government of his support. It was then that the Social Democrats added the crowning touch to their stupidity. Their journal, The Labor Press, accused Suvich of having deserted the Austrian Army in World War I. The Social Democrats organized turbulent street demonstrations against “Il Duce’s” delegate. It was only through a massive contingent of police and the Heimwehr that Suvich was protected from personal injury. In order to make amends with Suvich, the government suspended the mailing of The Labor Press for one month. The Social Democrats answered with more intense demonstrations, which, in turn, resulted in the crushing of their leaders by government troops and the Heimwehr, and brought about an end to the rule of the Social Democratic Party in Viennese city government.

Leaders of the Social Democratic Party who had fled to London, Paris, and Prague now openly refused any support of Austria in her fight against Hitler. They felt there was no difference between Austrian “fascism” and that of the Nazis, and that it was not the charge of the western democracies to interfere in the struggle between the two fascist groups.

At any rate, the powers had no intention of confronting Hitler. From March of 1933 on, the fate of Austria lay entirely in the hands of the Italians. Had Italy not been prepared to intervene, Hitler, in 1934, would have intervened in Austria’s battle against the insurgency of Austrian Nazis and German “tourists.” When English policies concerning the Ethiopian question drove Italy into the arms of Hitler, the fate of Austria was sealed.

There are no words strong enough to describe the absurdity of English politics between the two wars. The English were unteachable. They believed they knew and understood everything better. They were mistrustful of everyone; but they believed everything the National Socialists said.

The behavior of the Czechs was even dumber. Even in 1938, Benes had seen in the restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy an evil greater than the Anschluss. The French took a position that was forthrightly sympathetic with Hitler. Nearly all educated Frenchmen were reading the Gringoire,² which openly defended Hitler. Quos Deus vult perdere, dementat³

It was completely impossible to battle this stubbornness. When I went to Geneva I had hoped to be successful in contributing to the enlightenment of controlling personalities. But I soon came to realize that this was a futile undertaking. “We Englishmen,” I was told by a member of the English Labour Party, “never want to wage war again.” I asked: “And if Hitler should attack England?” The answer was bewildering: “Then we will just be ruled and exploited by German instead of English capitalists. It makes no difference to the people.”

Since 1931, the League of Nations in Vienna was represented by a Dutchman named Rost van Tonningen. In Vienna, Rost openly advanced pro-Nazi propaganda. (When he later withdrew from the League of Nations and returned home, he was immediately appointed deputy führer of the National Socialist Party in the Netherlands.) My Viennese friends could not believe that it was impossible for me to achieve Rost’s dismissal.

Only one nation had attempted serious opposition to Hitler on the European continent—the Austrian nation. It was only after five years of successful resistance that little Austria surrendered, abandoned by all. The whole world breathed a sigh of relief. Now Hitler would finally be satisfied; now he would deal peacefully with other nations. Twenty-seven months later, Hitler was the master of the European continent.