Index

ABCD powers, 104–16; America’s commitments to, 304–7; and American showdown with Japan, 187; application of “winds” message to, 220; denial of, by majority report, 367–68; Stimson and Knox on, 308

Aircraft carriers, disposition of, at time of Pearl Harbor attack, 12, 13, 27, 32, 248–49

Airplanes, for Pearl Harbor defense, short-age of, 92–93

Alsop, Joseph, on nondeclared war in Atlantic, 94–95

American fleet, see Fleet, Pacific fleet

American people: blaming of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, by President Truman, 325–26; hoodwinking of, by Roosevelt administration, as to war with Japan, 328; not informed of warlike operations of leaders, 326; not responsible for acts of leaders in Washington, 326

Anti-aircraft weapons, see Pearl Harbor defenses

Anglo-American collaboration, development of, 105–9

Army Board of Investigation: appointment of, 347; findings of, on guilt in Pearl Harbor disaster, 311, 405–6; report of, on conflicting messages to General Short, 242; report of, on unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor, 29, 31–32, 169–71; report of, on “winds” message, suppression of, 198; report of, to Secretary of War, on Pearl Harbor attack, 49

Atlantic Charter, 87, 122

Atlantic Charter Conference, 117–26; subsidiary agreement of, on dealing with Japan, 369–70

Axis, 7

Axis consular staffs, ousting of, from United States, 87

Axis funds, freezing of, 87

Azores, American plan for seizure of, 88

Balloon barrage defense at Pearl Harbor, lack of, 249, 250, 251

Bellinger, Patrick N. L., prophecy of, of attack on Pearl Harbor, 74–76

“Bomb plot” message of Japanese, 248–49, 393–94

Bratton, Colonel R. S., aggressiveness of, in handling vital information, 170; attempt of, to inform Marshall of break in diplomatic relations with Japan, 171, 275; failure of, to win advancement, 271, 399; delivery by, of “bomb plot” message, 393

British imperialism in Asia and Pacific, American protection of, 128–29

Canary Islands, British plan for seizure of, 88

Canton-Enderbury deal between Britain and United States, 105

Cape Verde Islands, British plan for seizure of, 88

Casualties at Pearl Harbor, 37, 39, 310, 327

Chamberlain, Neville, and Anglo-Polish relations, 5–6

Chiang Kai-shek: “dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism,” 152; opposition of, to modus Vivendi of Hull, 155–59, 287, 288, 377

China: American aid to, in war with Japan, 98–100; and “parallel declarations” of United States, Britain, and Holland, 121–22; disorganization of, 4; Japanese peace tender to, terms of, 130–31

“China Incident,” 4

Churchill, Winston: appointment of, as prime minister, 52–53; boasts of, at entanglement of United States in war with Japan, 115–16; on lend-lease as handicap to American defense, 93; and “parallel declarations,” 118, 119, 123–24; on “parallel” action of Great Britain against Japan, 123–24, 370–71

Clarke, Colonel Carter W.: and Pearl Harbor investigations, 201; inquiry by, on Pearl Harbor disaster, on behalf of General Marshall, 201, 316, 384

Clausen, Major Henry C., activities of, in establishing blame for Pearl Harbor disaster, 109–110, 200–201; 315; attempts of, to induce witnesses to change testimony, 200–201; investigation by, of validity of “winds” message, 220

Colonial empires of white nations, Japanese threat to, 101

Congress: adjournment of, on December 4–5, 1941, 300; appropriations of, for national defense, 1934–41, 362; not responsible for loss of Guam, 366–67

Conley, E. T., estimate by, of enemy plan for attack on Pearl Harbor, 74

Conscription, first peacetime, 46

Cramer, Major General Myron C: and Pearl Harbor investigations, 199–200, 201; and validity of “winds” message, 201, 220–21

Cryptanalysis or “Magic”, 168; legislation on, in form of Senate Bill 805, 171–72; withdrawal of bill, 172

Declaration of war: against Germany, Congressional vote on, 39; against Great Britain by Japan, time of, 164; against Italy by United States, Congressional vote on, 39; against Japan by United States, Congressional vote on, 38; against Japan by United States, deadline for, 289–91; against Japan by United States, time of, 38; against United States by Germany and Italy, time of, 39; against United States by Japan, and first overt act, 253, 273, 275; against United States by Japan, time of, 38, 164; by United States, British expectations of, after 1940 election, 86

Diplomatic negotiations between United States and Japan, see Peace negotiations between United States and Japan

“Do-don’t” warnings to commanders at Hawaii, 223–42

Drum, Hugh A., prophecy of surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor, 74

Dutch Guiana, American occupation of, 87; Japanese reaction to, 115

“East wind rain” message, see under “Winds” message

Economic sanctions against Japan, American program of, 99, 119, 132–37, 147, 148, 283, 310

Executive, plurality in, The Federalist,iv, 321. See also President

Fleet, at Pearl Harbor, attack upon, dictated by logic, 358–59; damage to, tabulation of, 356–57. See also Pearl Harbor attack, damage during; disposition of, Japanese spy messages concerning, 248–52; disposition of, on December 6–7, 1941, 91, 274–75; “ships in harbor” reports to Tokyo, 248–52

Forrestal, Secretary of Navy: endeavor of, to discredit “winds” message, 199; private investigation by, on Pearl Harbor disaster, 202 ff., 313, 384–85; setting aside by, of Navy Court of Inquiry verdict on Kimmel, 313

Four-power entente, plan of, 6–7

France, weakness of, 4

General staff, responsibility of, for enforcement of orders, 84

German blitzkrieg in the west, date of, 52

Germany: defeat of, as main objective of Allies, 107, 110–11; “nonaggression” treaty with Russia, 6; and the tripartite alliance, 6–7

Gerow, General: failure of, to discharge duties as war plans officer, 265; promotion of, 265; responsibility of, for informing Short of imminence of attack, 230, 264–65, 388; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor defenses, 256, 396: responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 319

Gesell, Gerhard, and Pearl Harbor investigation, 201

Great Britain: American aid to, during 1940 and 1941, 86, 87, 88; Anglo-Polish relations, 5–6; faults of, 4

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 11, 374

Greenland, American occupation of, 87; American belligerent action in, before declaration of war, 88

Grew, Joseph C.: on American isolationism, 125; criticism by, of Roosevelt policy toward Japan, 145–46; on diplomatic relations with Japan, 127–29; on economic sanctions against Japan, 133; on fleet at Pearl Harbor as deterrent to Japan, 62; “green light” telegram on economic sanctions, 133–34; on proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting, 139, 142–43; on surprise attack by Japan, 273–74

Guam, loss of, conceded in Singapore agreement, 109; fortification of, testimony of Admiral Stark on, 366–67

Hart, Admiral, inquiry conducted by, into Pearl Harbor disaster, 347–48

Hawaiian commanders, choosing of, by Roosevelt, 321. See also Kimmel; Richardson; Short

Hawaiian defenses: alerting of, against sabotage and subversive activities, 229–31, 232–33, 257; on all-out alert in June and July, 1940, 53–54, 229, 246, 247, 387; proposal to weaken, to provide defense for Wake, Midway, and other islands, 233–35. See also Pearl Harbor defenses

Hewitt, Admiral, and Pearl Harbor investigations, 202 ff., 384–85

Hirohito, Emperor, reply of, to Roosevelt’s appeal of December 6, 1941, 164–65

Hitler: desire of, not to engage United States in war, 90, 94, 283; informed by Japan of imminence of war, 326; military fraud of, on the Japanese, 96–97, 189

Hopkins, Harry, allocation by, of patrol bombers, to Britain, 93

Hull, Secretary of State: belief of, in imminence of war with Japan, 266, 273; complaint of, on Japanese treachery, 190; criticisms of, in “appeasing” Japan, 157–60; deception by, in reporting progress of peace negotiations with Japan, 299; demands of, on Japan, 11; on fleet at Pearl Harbor as deterrent to Japan, 60; on Japanese reply to American proposals of November 26, 1941, 166; modus vivendi of: abandonment of, 154–59, 287–88, 377, Chinese opposition to, 155–59, 287, 288, 377, to effect three months’ truce with Japan, 154, 286; terms of, 375–77, 380; on possibility of surprise attack by Japan, 273, 274; proposals of, to Japan, on November 26, 1941, 152–53, 160–61, 186, 187, 285, 310, 377–80; see Japanese diplomatic note, final, to United States; on proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting, 139–40; responsibility of, for diplomacy leading to Pearl Harbor disaster, 319; on treachery of Pearl Harbor attack, 166

Iceland, America assumes garrisoning of, 87

Indo-China: Japanese occupation of, 98, 115, 137, 173; proposed neutralization of, 120–21

Ingersoll, Admiral, testimony of, on “winds” message, 215

Intelligence, importance of, to conduct of war, 260–61, 281–82

Italy, declaration of war by, as “stab in back” of France, 86

Japan: American proposals to, November 26, 1941, 160–61, Japanese reply to, 165–66; blockade of, by United States, 59, 60; and China, 11; economic sanctions against, American program of, 99, 119, 132–37, 147, 148, 283, 310; final proposals of, for understanding with United States, 150–51; first overt act by, as desire of Roosevelt administration, 271, 292–93, 387, 388, 402; first overt act by, simultaneous with declaration of war, 253, 395; foreign assets of, freezing of, 11, 132, 147, 148, 173, 179–80, 284; foreign policy of, in November, 1941, 180; “incident” on part of, as object of Roosevelt, 301–4; modus vivendi of November 20 and 21, 1941, 150–51; oil embargo against, 134–36; “parallel declarations” to, by United States, Britain, and Holland, 117–25, 188; policy of, to keep peace with United States, 174; policy of totalitarian expansion of, in South Seas, 98; position of, in Far East, just before Pearl Harbor attack, 177–78; relations with United States, deterioration of, 98–103; seizure by, of Indo-China, 98; surplus population of, problem of, 101–2; surprise attack by, anticipation of, by high officials in Washington, 273, 395; surprise attack by, forecast of, for weekend or holiday, 210–11, 385; surprise attack by, prophecies of, 163; and tripartite alliance, see Tripartite alliance; ultimatum to, by Roosevelt, in August, 1941, 122–23, 125; ultimatums to, by United States, 125–26

Japanese aggression in Far East: and A B C D powers, 105–16; and “parallel declarations” of United States, Britain and Holland, 117–25; “deadlines” for, established by agreement of United States, Britain, and Holland, 289–92, 335 (map)

Japanese diplomatic note, final, to United States, 165–66, 188, 192, 194–196, 253, 269, 275

Japanese expeditions in Far East, probable objectives of, 291–92

Japanese fleet: at Pearl Harbor attack, 16; en route to Pearl Harbor, 163

Japanese fourteen-part note, see under Hull, Secretary of State

Japanese militarists, ambitious designs of, 144, 373

Japanese naval situation, Navy intelligence report on, dated December 1, 1941, 236–37

Japanese people, determination of, to fight to finish, in any war, 176

Japanese secret code: “Climb Mount Niitaka” message, 16, 22; cracking of, before Pearl Harbor, 13, 43, 168, 169–70; code machine destruction, 191, 192, 193, 194; order from Tokyo, for detruction of, 215, 217

Japanese secret code intercepts, 42–43, 44, 49; decoding and distribution of, in Washington, 196; disclosure in full of, 173–85; distribution of, to small circle in Washington, 261–62, 396; evaluation of, by Roosevelt and his circle, 263–64, 397; final message on December 7, 1941, 196; first reports of, on July 2, 1941, 173; full disclosure of, 173 ff.; importance of, 390–91; knowledge of, given to British Admiralty but denied to Hawaiian commanders, 252; nature and content of, revealed by Representative Gearhart, 172; plan for attack on Pearl Harbor indicated by, 248–52; secrecy in Washington surrounding, 262–63; sequence of, from November 24 to December 7, 1941, and interpretation, 186–97; spy messages between Tokyo and Hawaii, concerning Pearl Harbor defenses, 248–52, 392–95; indications in, of time and place of initial Japanese attack, 195–97; use of, in Pearl Harbor investigations, 49; withholding of, from Hawaiian commanders, 260–66. See also “Winds” message

Japanese submarines, activity of, before Pearl Harbor attack, 28–29, 32–33

Japanese telephone code, 187, 188

Joint Congressional Committee: observations on, by Burton K. Wheeler, 349–50; statement on, by Representative Keefe, 352; restrictions placed upon, by President Truman, 348–49; testimony before, on Pearl Harbor attack, 198–211, 212–22; witnesses appearing before, 337–38

Joint Congressional Committee, majority report of: on designs of Japanese militarists, 373; on “east wind rain” message, 383–84; on guilt in Pearl Harbor disaster, 318, 408–11; on Pearl Harbor disaster, 318, 348; Representative Keefe on, 352–53

Joint Congressional Committee, minority report of: on American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations, 127–28; on attack on fleet at Pearl Harbor, 358–59; “Conclusions of Fact and Responsibility” of, 411–13; difficulties encountered by, 348–52; on importance of “Magic,” 390–91; on Japanese spy messages, 393–95; on Pearl Harbor defenses, 91–92, 318–19; on responsibility of high officials for Pearl Harbor disaster, 318–19; on war warnings to Hawaiian commanders, 240; on “winds” message, 386

Jones, E. Stanley: on Roosevelt administration and peace with Japan, 100–103: on solution for disposal of surplus population of Japan, 101–2

Keefe, Representative: on assessment of blame for Pearl Harbor disaster, 352–53; on tactics in retiring Kimmel and Short, 48–50

Kimmel, Admiral: appointment of, as commander of Pacific fleet, 63, 69; on basing of fleet at Pearl Harbor, as deterrent to Japan, 67; blaming of, for failure of defense against torpedoes, 83; condemnation of, by Roosevelt, 40–42: court-martial of, threat of, 46, 48, 311; exoneration of, by Navy Court, 49, 311, 312; messages to, concerning defense of Wake and Midway islands, 233–34; not informed of most important diplomatic steps of 1941, 388; not sent most vital Japanese code intercepts, 245 ff., 391; persecution of, 46; on reconnaissance requirements for island base, 72–73; references to, in Knox report, 40; removal of, from command, 41, 42, 311, 312; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 319; retirement of, 46, 311; as scapegoat, 40, 49, 50, 311: testimony of, on “winds” message, 221–22; on vulnerability of fleet at Pearl Harbor, 65; on weakness of Pearl Harbor defenses, 69–70. See also War warnings to Hawaiian commanders

Kita, Nagoa, Consul General at Honolulu, spy messages of, concerning American ship movements, 248–52

Kintner, Robert, on nondeclared war in Atlantic, 94–95

“Known impending war,” situation of, after November 26, 1941, 243 ff., 390 ff.

Knox, Secretary of Navy: as agent in retirement of Kimmel and Short, 46; announcement of, to President, of Pearl Harbor attack, 15; appointment of, 86; inquiry conducted for, into Pearl Harbor disaster, 49, 347–48; “lost” message from, to Kimmel on night of December 6, 1941, 272; official report of, on damage at Pearl Harbor, 40; on possibility of torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor, 81–82; on two-ocean navy, 15; receipt by, of thirteen-part Japanese message, 271; report of, to Roosevelt, on “midnight warning” of December 7, 1941, 272; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 318–19; secret report of, to Roosevelt, 40, and remarks in, on impairment of Pearl Harbor defenses, 92

Konoye, Prince: cabinet of, resignation of, 143, 176; and four-power agreement, 6; meeting with Roosevelt, proposals for, 138–43; resignation of, 18; suicide of, 143

Kra Peninsula, threatened attack on, by Japan, 236, 304, 305

Kramer, Capt. Alwin D.: pressure upon, and reversal of testimony, 276, 400; on Japanese message of December 6–7, 1941, 266–67, 269, 271; note from, to Knox, on expected attack on Pearl Harbor, 276; testimony of, at Pearl Harbor investigations, 212, 213–15, 218; and “winds” message, 199, 206

Kurusu, Saburo: attempts of, at negotions with United States, 146–47, 149–51; 182–84; reaction of, to American proposals of November 26, 1941, 161–62

Leahy, Admiral, on fleet at Pearl Harbor as deterrent to Japan, 65

Lend-lease Act, enactment of, 87

Lend-lease: as cause of impairment of Pearl Harbor defenses, 91–93; opinions of minority and majority reports concerning, 360–62; proposals for, by Roosevelt, 86

Lyttelton, Capt. Oliver, American provocation of Japan, statement on, 116

McCollum, Captain A. H.: on likelihood of Japanese attack on American fleet, 354; and message prepared for dispatch to Kimmel, 208, 219, 385; and “winds” message, 208, 218

“Magic” intelligence, see Japanese code intercepts; “Winds” message; Cryptanalysis

Malay barrier, defense of, plans for, 106, 107

Malaya, threatened attack on, 304

Manila harbor, enlargement of, to accommodate British naval units, 112

Marines, ordering of, into Iceland, 87

Marshall, General: absence of, at time of delivery of Japanese final note, 275; appeal of, to Governor Dewey, on cracking of Japanese code, 201–2; on America’s entry into European war, 90; bungling by, of last-minute warning to Hawaii, 44, 238–40, 241, 277 ff., 390, 400; criticism of, by Army Board and by Short, 277–78; failure of, to use scrambler phone or other quick means of warning Hawaii, 238, 277 ff., 390; recollections of, on happenings of night of December 6, 1941, 269; responsibility of, in matter of alerting Hawaii for possible attack, 230, 388; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor defenses, 254–259, 396; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 319; on retirement of Short, 45; charge of tampering by, with evidence relating to Pearl Harbor, 316

Marshall Islands, raids against, anticipation of, 237, 243

Martin, Major General: message from, to Washington, on Hawaiian alert against sabotage, 233; prophecy of, of attack on Pearl Harbor, 74–76; removal of, from command, 41

Merchant ships, arming of, 87

Miles, Major General, on distribution of Japanese code intercepts, 261–63

Mitchell, William D., and Pearl Harbor investigation, 202

Molotov, Vyacheslav, and four-power agreement, 7, 353–54

Mussolini, and support of Japan, 96, 193

National defense, appropriations for, by Congress, 1934–41, 362; curtailment of appropriations for, by Roosevelt, 362

National Guard, mustering of, by Roosevelt, 86

National Park Service, cause of delay in installation of radar service, 71

Navy: ordering of, to shoot at Axis ships on sight, 87; two-ocean, authorization of, by Congress, 53

Navy Court of Inquiry: appointment of, 347; exoneration by, of Kimmel, 49, 311, 312; report of, to Secretary of Navy, on Pearl Harbor attack, 49, 168

Navy establishment, possible motives of, for making war, 327

Neutrality act, revision of, to permit “cash and carry” of arms shipments, 86

Neutrality of American people, as a bar to declaration of war, 293–94

“North wind cloudy” message, see under “Winds” message

Nomura, Admiral: on attitude of Japanese people toward United States, 162, 164; and diplomatic relations between United States and Japan, 129–36; last attempts of, to further peace negotiations with United States, 180–82; on preparations of A B C D powers in Southwest Pacific area, 164; on proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting, 138; summoned to White House, to receive ultimatum, 122

“Nonaggression” treaty of Hitler and Stalin, 6

Noyes, Admiral: action by, upon receipt of “winds” message, 206 ff.; testimony of, on “winds” message, 216, 217

Oil embargo against Japan, 134–36

“Overt act” restriction, 278–79, 388

Pacific fleet, basing of, at Pearl Harbor, 51–67; as deterrent to Japan, 54, 55–58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67, 358; Joint Congressional Committee minority view of, 65–67, 358–59; in belief of its safety, 65; objections of Admiral Richardson to, 55, 56, 65–67, 358; State Department influence on Navy, 60–62; traditional, on West Coast, 51, 52

Pacific fleet, command of, transferring of, to Kimmel, 63, 69; fueling of, 65; inferiority of, to Japanese fleet, on December 7, 1941, 93; insecurity of, at Pearl Harbor, 51; sending of, to Pearl Harbor, 54 ff.; splitting of, 12; strength of, bottled in Pearl Harbor, 13; stripping of, for Atlantic war, 90; units of, at Pearl Harbor, subject of spy messages between Hawaii and Tokyo, 248–52; vulnerability of, at Pearl Harbor, 54, 63, 65; weakening of, by Roosevelt, 94

Panama Canal: closing of, to Japanese shipping, 100, 147; concerning defense message to, alert, 278

“Parallel declarations” to Japan: American public unaware of, 122, 123; British action on, no record of, 124, 370; by United States, Britain, and Holland, 117–25, 188

Patrol planes, for Pearl Harbor defense, shortage of, 92–93

Peace negotiations between United States and Japan before Pearl Harbor attack, 9, 126–43; breaking off of, 183 ff., 189–90, 253, 275; failure of, 162, 178–85, 186; Japanese “deadline” on, 179 ff., 182, 184, 186, 187, 248, 276, 298; Japanese urgency concerning, 148–50, 180 ff.; last attempts at understanding, 146–54, 178–85; mere play-acting after November 28, 1941, 190, 191, 247, 248; proposals of Hull to Japan, on November 26, 1941, 152–53, 160–61, 186, 187; Japanese reply to, 165–66, 188, 192, first thirteen parts, 194–95, 266–67, fourteenth part, 196, 269; stalemate of, 137–38

Pearl Harbor: as base for Pacific fleet, objections to, 65–67; conversion of, into fleet base, 52; future, prevention of, 327; state of unreadiness at, on December 7, 1941, 83–84; as strategic position, in Pacific, 62; surprise air attack on, prophecies of, 74–76

Pearl Harbor attack: American losses during, 34, 37; claims of Japanese on, 39; first government report by Roosevelt on, 39; Roosevelt’s reports to cabinet and to public on, 39

Pearl Harbor attack: berthings of fleet during (map), 333; casualties at, 37, 39, 310; damage during, 37, by dive-bombers, 36, to fleet, 356–57, by horizontal bombers, 36, by large armor piercing shells, 36, by torpedoes, 35–36, Japanese estimate of, 37, official report on, by Knox, 40; incidents just preceding, 27–33; as issue in Congressional election of 1942, 48; Japanese planes used in, number of, 16, 355; Japanese plans for, 18 ff.; Japanese strategy during, 24–26; Kimmel and Short not solely responsible for failure, 322; limited conditions of readiness of Army and Navy, 31–32, 34 ff.; “lost” documents concerning, 43, 199, 207, 216, 219, 222, 350; “no one in Washington expected an attack,” 223; objectives of, at island of Oahu (map), 332; phases of, 35–36; plan for, indication of, in spy messages between Tokyo and Hawaii, 248–52; prophecy of, on January 27, 1941, given no credence, 246, 252; radar warning of, 30–31; radio warnings of, 3; repelling of, as a possibility, 258–59; ships in harbor, at time of, 34–35; strategic objective of, 24; time and place of, indication of, in Japanese reply of December 6–7, 1941, 243; time and place of, knowledge available to Roosevelt, Hull, and others concerning, 167; time and place of, learned from Japanese code intercepts, 172; time of (start), 34, 164; time of (start), warnings of, in Japanese secret code intercepts, 195–97; time of (finish), 36; unpreparedness of Army and Navy in Hawaii at time of, 31; weapons used by Japanese in, 35, 36; “winds” message as warning of, 210–11

Pearl Harbor defenses: Admiral Yarnell’s test of, in 1932, 17–18, 51; anti-aircraft crews, firing on own planes, 80; antiaircraft weapons for, 78, 79, 80, 92; balloon barrage defense, lack of, 250, 251; distance reconnaissance, absence of, 72; failure of, due to obsolete ideas of high command in Washington, 81; impairment of, through lend-lease and other diversions, 91–93, 360–62; joint Army-Navy coastal frontier defense plan, 69; not properly alerted for surprise attack, 31–32, 169, 229, 242, 247, 254–58, 260, 323; Oahu Army garrison, duties of, 69; patrol planes for, diversion of, under lend-lease, 77; patrol planes for, shortage of, 92–93; radar for, installation of, delays in, 70, 71; radar for, hours of operation of, on December 7, 1941, 72; readiness of, as clear responsibility of Washington, 185; readiness of, dependent upon foreknowledge of attack, 253; reconnaissance equipment, absence of and responsibility of Washington for, 77; reconnaissance requirements for, Kimmel testimony on, 72–73; spy messages concerning, between Tokyo and Hawaii, 248–52; strength of, Martin-Bellinger comment on, 76; strengthening of, allowances to Short for, 70; strengthening of, requested by Short, 70; weakening of, by Roosevelt, 94; weakness of, in February, 1941, 69. See also Hawaiian defenses

Pearl Harbor disaster: blame for, placing of, by Roberts Commission, 44–45; primarily failure of men, not of laws or powers, 327; “responsibility” for, of American people, 325–26; responsibility for, of high administration officials, 318–19; responsibility for, of Roosevelt, 318 ff

Pearl Harbor investigations, v–ix; secret investigations, by Secretaries of War and Navy, 49; testimony at, conflicting, 212–222; testimony at, reversal of, by key witnesses, 50, 200, 212–22; withholding of vital information from Joint Congressional Committee, 352; witnesses at, intimidation of, 200–201, 213–14, 222. See also Army Board of Investigation; Navy Board of Inquiry; “Winds” message

Pearl Harbor records, destruction of, 199, 207, 216, 219, 222, 350

Philippines, loss of, envisioning of, at Singapore staff conference, 108–9

Poland, Anglo-Polish relations, 5–6

President of United States: appointment by, of all high military and naval officers, 320; conducting by, of all diplomatic negotiations on behalf of United States, 320; power of, to organize and unify all subsidiary agencies, 325; power of, to issue orders and instructions to civil secretaries, and chief of staff and of naval operations, 320–21; powers and duties of, in connection with military establishments, 320–21; vesting in, by Congress, of whole and indivisible executive power, 320

President’s Commission to investigate Pearl Harbor disaster, see Roberts Commission

Prisoners of war, first, in American nondeclared war, 88

Promotion of officers on administration side of Pearl Harbor investigation, 270–71; 399

Puleston, W. D., on splitting of United States fleet, 53

Radar at Pearl Harbor: hours of operation of, on December 7, 1941, 72; installation, delays in, 70, 71

Rankin, Jeanette, dissenting vote of, on war with Japan, 38; abstention of, in vote on war with Germany and Italy, 39

Reconnaissance, see Pearl Harbor defenses

Ribbentrop, Joachim von, and four-power agreement, 6–7, 353–54; on Japanese relations with America and Britain, 96

Richardson, Admiral: on alliance with Great Britain, 63; on fleet at Pearl Harbor as deterrent to Japan, 62, 64; objections of, to basing of fleet at Pearl Harbor, 55, 56, 65–67; opposition of, to war with Japan, 63; protests of, to Roosevelt, on basing of fleet at Pearl Harbor, 56–57; removal of, for opposition to Roosevelt on basing of fleet, 63, 64

Roberts, Justice, Owen J., on interception of Japanese messages, 42–43

Roberts Commission: appointment of, by Roosevelt, 41; avoidance of, of criticism of Washington in Pearl Harbor matter, 44; Congressional Investigating Committee on, report of, 42–43; criticism by, of Kimmel and Short, 43, 311; faults of, 43; jurisdiction of, 42; Kimmel on, 45; members of, 41, honors and favor for, by Roosevelt administration, 41–42, 399; misinformation given, 43; report of, effect of, 48; report of, on war warnings to Hawaiian commanders, 44, 240–42; verdict of, concerning Kimmel and Short, 42; whitewashing by, of General Marshall’s part in Pearl Harbor disaster, 44

Roosevelt, Franklin D., President: on American protection of British colonial empire, 128; announcement by, that America is in the war “all the way,” 167; announcement of, that “the shooting has started,” October 27, 1941, 87; appointment by, of Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 321; approval by, of joint Anglo-American war plans, 109–10, 113; attempts of, to bring about Japanese “incident,” 301–304; back door entry by, into war, 95, 283; and blockade of Japan, 59, 60; choice by, of Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and others, 322; as center of movement toward war, 103; defender of British and Dutch imperialism, 10; desire of, for war with Hitler, 94, 283; desire of, for war with Japan, 116; determination of, to prepare American people for acceptance of war, 295–97; direct appeal of, to Hirohito on December 6, 1941, “for the record,” 164, delivery of, twenty minutes before Pearl Harbor attack, 164, Hirohito’s reply, 164–65; in “do-don’t” message to Short, “Japan to commit first overt act,” 227, 229; failure of, to place Hawaiian defenses on all-out alert, 323; on fleet at Pearl Harbor as deterrent to Japan, 58, 258; fleet split by, 12; handling by, of retirement of Kimmel and Short, 40, 42, 48; deception by, in speeches to American people concerning war with Japan, 299; “I hate war,” August 19, 1936, 85; Japanese “mistake” as casus belli for United States, 58, 283–84; on Japanese aggression, 162, 163, 164; Japanese solution of dilemma of, in Pearl Harbor attack, 308–9; message of, to Congress declaring war on Japan, 38, 39; message of, to Hirohito, December 6, 1941, 9, 10, 284, 295–96, 307–8; concealed purpose of, 307–8; message of, to Hitler, April, 1939, 9; motives of, for making war, 327, Albert Jay Nock on motives for, 283; and “parallel declarations,” 119; orders from, for undeclared Atlantic war, 89; pledge of, “again and again and again: Your sons . . . not . . . to be sent into any foreign wars,” 58–59, 86, 284; pledges of, not to wage foreign war, 85; policy of, toward Japan, as seen by Capt. Oliver Lyttelton of Britain, 116; policy of, which took United States into war, 309; power of, in diplomatic negotiations, 322; power of, to issue military and naval orders, 321; power of, to reorganize War and Navy Departments, 322; pretense of, of surprise at Pearl Harbor attack, 14–15, 166–67, 190–91; proposed message by, to be delivered to Congress in December, 1941, 296, 403–404, never used, 326; “quarantine” speech of, on October 5, 1937, 85; rejection by, of proposed meeting with Prince Konoye, 140, 142; responsibility of, for basing fleet at Pearl Harbor, 54, 62, 65; responsibility of, for evaluation of Japanese code intercepts, 263–64, 397; responsibility of, for failure to alert Pearl Harbor defenses for attack, 318–20, 323 ff., 398, see also under Pearl Harbor defenses; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 318–19, 329, report on, by Joint Congressional Committee, 319–20; on responsibility of President, 321; secret agreements of, with A B C D powers, 104–16; secret agreements of, with British and Dutch, 110, 284, 288, 367; secret diplomacy of, 117–26, 310; secret warlike acts of, 88; selection by, of all chiefs of staff and of naval operations, 321, of all commanders in Hawaiian area, 321; speeches on peace and schemes for war, 85–88; stage set by, at time of Pearl Harbor attack, 276–77, 308; and surprise attack, 13, 14, 15; on two-ocean navy, 53; ultimatum of, to Japan, on August 17, 1941, 122–23, 125, 187, 192, 290, 294–95, 371; ultimatum of, to Japan, on November 26, 1941, see under Hull, Secretary of State; visit to, by King and Queen of England, 85. See also President of United States.

Roosevelt administration: desire of, that Japan commit first overt act, 271, 292–93, 328, 387, 388

Roosevelt-Konoye meeting: proposals for, 138–43; urging of, by Grew, 175; urging of, by Sir Robert Craigie, 174–75; urging of, by Tokyo, 174

Russia: American support of, against Germany, 87; expansion program of, 353–54; and the tripartite alliance, 6, 7; faults of, 5; neutrality of, to be respected by Japan, 193; “nonaggression” treaty with Germany, 6

Sabotage at Pearl Harbor, see under War warnings

Sadtler, Colonel Otis K.: aggressiveness of, in handling of vital information, 170; advancement of, failure to win, 271; testimony of, on “winds” message, 215–16

Safford, Commander Laurance F.: Navy award to, of Legion of Merit, 214–15; testimony of, on “winds” message, 199, 202–11, 218–19

Sanctions, see Economic sanctions

Shapiro, L. S. B., on Russian program for expansion, 353–54

“Ships in harbor” reports to Tokyo, by consul general in Honolulu, 248–52, 265

Short, General Walter C.: allowances to, for improving Pearl Harbor defenses, 70; comments of, on “do-don’t” message from Stimson, November 27, 1941, 229; condemnation of, by Roosevelt, 42; court-martial of, threat of, 46, 48, 311, 313–14, 317; exoneration of, by judge advocate general, 315; fastening on, of blame for Pearl Harbor disaster, by high officers in War Department, 316; message from, to Washington, on Hawaiian alert against sabotage, 230, 233, 388, 397; message to, concerning defense of Wake and Midway Islands, 234; not informed of dangers of attack, 169–70, 251; not informed of most important diplomatic steps of 1941, 388; not informed of spy messages on fleet based at Pearl Harbor, 248–52; not sent most vital Japanese code intercepts, 252, 391–92; persecution of, 46; references to, in Knox secret report, 40; removal of, from command, 41, 42, 45, 311; requests of, for strengthening of Pearl Harbor defenses, 70; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 319; retirement of, 45–46, 311, 313; as scapegoat, 40, 47, 49, 50, 259, 311; testimony of, on “winds” message, 221. See also War warnings to Hawaiian commanders.

Singapore base, joint Anglo-American use of, 105

Singapore joint staff conference, in 1941, agreements reached at, 108, 289–90, 367–69

Smith, General Walter Bedell: comments of, on British intelligence officers, 270; omissions by, in handling of thirteen-part Japanese message on December 6, 1941, 269–71; promotion of, 270, 271

Sonnet, Lieutenant Commander John, investigation by, of Pearl Harbor disaster, 202 ff.

Southeast Asia, attack on, anticipation of, 236, 237, 243

Southwest Pacific: American defense of, 114; attack on, anticipation of, 237, 243

Spy messages between Tokyo and Hawaii, see under Japanese code intercepts

Stark, Admiral Harold R.: on danger of torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor, 82; on fleet at Pearl Harbor, as deterrent to Japan, 55, 63; letters of, to Richardson, on basing fleet at Pearl Harbor, 54; receipt by, of fourteen-part Japanese message on December 7, 1941, 269; recollections of, on happenings of night of December 6, 1941, 267–69; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 319; retirement of, 312; testimony of, on fortification of Guam, 366–67; on undeclared Atlantic war, 88–89

Stimson, Secretary of War Henry L.: apology of, for Roosevelt and others, 328–29; appointment of, 86; endeavor of, to discredit “winds” message, 199–201; on imminence of Japanese attack, 274; absent from Pearl Harbor hearings, 271; relief of, at news of Pearl Harbor attack, 309; responsibility of, for war with Japan, 287; responsibility of, for Pearl Harbor disaster, 318–19

Thailand: proposed neutralization of, 120–21; threatened occupation of, by Japan, 187, 192, 236, 304

Thomas, Senator, introduction of Senate Bill 805 by, concerning disclosure of crytographic information, 171–72

Tojo, General Hideki: accession of, as premier of Japan, 144; and war party of Japan, 19

Tojo government, secret messages of, 178–85

Top secret information, see Japanese secret code intercepts

Tovoda, Admiral, on pronosed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting, 140–42

Torpedo attack: on Pearl Harbor, as possibility, according to Knox, 81–82; on Pearl Harbor, danger of, minimized by Admiral Stark, 82; at Taranto in 1940, 81, 82

Torpedo nets, 83

Torpedoes: defense against, failure of, at Pearl Harbor, 83: Japanese surprise attack achieved with, 82; launching of, depth thought desirable for, 82; precautions against, Navy Department’s failure in matter of, 83

Tripartite pact: as it affected Japanese-American relations, 131–32, 136–37, 148, 149–50, 151; proposed broadening of, into a four-power entente, 6–7; Hull’s attitude toward, 181–82; pledges of, 11

Truman, President Harry S.: attempt of, to discredit “winds” message, 199; attempt of, to saddle blame for Pearl Harbor disaster on American people, 311, 325–26

Turner, Admiral Richmond K.: on economic sanctions against Japan, 135–37; on joint Army-Navy war plan, 110–11; suppression by, of warning message to Kimmel, 208, 219, 385; on “winds” message, 218

Tyler, Lieut. Kermit A., 30–31

United States: as “arsenal of democracy,” 87; conversations of, on defense of British and Dutch colonies, 59; entry of, into World War II, 3; joining of, with Allies, in World War II, 113–14; negotiations with Japan, 9; relations with Japan, deterioration of, 98–103; secret alliance of, with Great Britain, 52; in state of war before Pearl Harbor attack, 7–8, 87–89

War: acceptance of, by people of United States, preparation for, 295–97: American public not in favor of, 111; condition of “known impending war,” 84; declaration of, see Declaration of war: global, United States involved in, 288 ff., with Japan, certainty of, after Tokyo message of November 8, 1941, 188 ff., 380–81; with Japan, imminence of, deception practiced by Hull, Roosevelt and others on American people, 298–99; with Japan, imminence of, well known to Washington high officials, 267–72, 279–301; with Japan, Roosevelt’s desire for, 116; Japanese-American, inevitability of, in event of breakdown of negotiations, 178–85; Japanese preparations for, completion of, 186; modus vivendi to delay war, see under Hull, Secretary of State; non-declared war in Atlantic, 87–89, 90; of races, against United States and Britain, 193; secret, against Japan and Germany, 330; situation of “known impending war” after November 26, 1941, 243 ff.; United States in state of war before December 7, 1941, 7–8; against United States, Britain, and Holland, a certainty, on December 5, 1941, 194; unpreparedness for, of United States, at time of Pearl Harbor attack, 285–87

War alliances, secret, 104, 109, 111, 112

“War Cabinet”: membership of, 324; motives of, for making war, 327

“War Council,” membership of, 323–24

War Department, negligence of, in handling of vital information on December 6 and 7, 1941, 170–71

War guilt, vii, 187, 319–30

War party, influence of, on Roosevelt, 102–3

War plans: American-British-Dutch, discussion of, at staff conference in Singapore, April, 1941, 108; Anglo-American discussions of, at joint staff conference in Washington, spring of 1941, 106–8; Army plan supplementing “Rainbow No. 5,” 110; Army-Navy basic war plan, “Rainbow No. 5,” 110–11, 226; joint Anglo-American, Japanese knowledge of, 114–15; joint Anglo-American, Roosevelt’s approval of, 109–10, 113; joint Anglo-American, terms of, 113; Navy basic war plan, “WPL-46,” 110, 226; new joint, in progress on December 7, 1941, 112; Pacific fleet’s plan, “WPPac-26,” 110; WPL 52, Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5, 236

War warnings: of attack on Philippines or Guam, sent to Kimmel, November 24, 1941, 225; of attack on Philippines or Kra Peninsula, sent to Kimmel, November 27, 1941, 225; emphasis in, on sabotage, 43, 226, 229–33, 240, 241, 243, 254–58; final message to Hawaii, from Washington, bungling in transmission of, 44, 238–40, 241, 277 ff., 390, 400; to Hawaiian commanders, “do-don’t” messages, 44, 223–42; to Hawaiian commanders, failure of, to apprise of impending attack, 223, 228, 241, 243–44, 250, 254, 260–61, 265–66, 273, 276, 389, 392; to Hawaiian commanders, on imminence of attack, delay in sending, 274–75, 277 ff.; to Hawaiian commanders, summary of facts concerning, 240–42; by high Washington authorities, not sufficient for all-out alert in Hawaii, 240–42; Japanese intercepts of vital importance not relayed to Kimmel and Short, 244–45, 247, 251–52; letter from Knox to Stimson, January 24, 1941, on war with Japan, 223; message to General Martin on sabotage and subversive activities, 232; message to Kimmel, on “preparatory deployment” of fleet, October 16, 1941, 224; message for dispatch to Kimmel, killed in Navy Department, 208, 219; messages to Short on dangers of sabotage and subversive activities, 229; no direct orders for all-out alert to Hawaiian commanders, 31–32, 169, 229, 242, 247, 260; of November 28, 1941, indicates advisability of all-out alert, 188–89; no proper information on Japanese diplomatic situation to Hawaiian commanders, 228–30, 244–45, 247, 253, 401; to Short, “do-don’t” message from Stimson and others, November 27, 1941, 226–29; testimony on, by General Short, 229, 231–32, 252, 257

Warships: American, under British and Canadian naval command, 88; disposition of, at time of Pearl Harbor attack, 248–52, 274–75

Washington conference of joint American and British staffs in 1941: agreement of, concerning defense of Pacific Ocean by United States, 108, (map) 334; agreement of, on master war plan, 109, 367; agreements reached at, 106–8; American representatives at, 107; British representatives at, 107

Welles, Sumner, on Atlantic conference of August, 1941, 117–24

“West wind clear” message, see under “Winds” message

“Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5,” 88

Wilkinson, Admiral T. S.: and Pearl Harbor investigations, 202; suppression by, of warning message to Kimmel, 208, 219, 385

“Winds” message: and changing of Japanese and American Navy codes, December 4, 1941, 210; British translation of, 209; confirmations of, 209; disappearance of, from Army and Navy files, 199, 207, 216–17, 219, 222; discrediting of, by high officials, 199–211; distribution of, to top officials of Army and Navy, 206–208; “east wind rain” message, 14, 183, 198, 202–11, 250; insertion of, in daily shortwave broadcast from Tokyo, 198; minority report of Joint Congressional Committee on, 386; “north wind cloudy” message, 183, 198; as notification of secret war decision, 198; radio station logs showing reception of, destruction of, 199; “signal of execute” theory of, 210; significance of, as emergency code, 205; testimony on, by Captain Laurance F. Safford, 199, 202–11; theory that message meant war with Great Britain, 213, 218, 219; translation of, 206; “west wind clear” message, 183, 198. See also Japanese secret code intercepts

World War II, United States entry into, 3

Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, on Pearl Harbor attack and Pacific fleet, 18; on probability of war with United States, 145

Yarnell, Admiral: test of Pearl Harbor defenses in 1932, 17–18, 51